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DUOPOLIES, RESTRICTIONS, AND CONTENT
REGULATION: HOW MUCH ACCESS ARE WE
REALLY GETTING FROM BROADBAND
INTERNET ACCESS?
Tramanh Phi*
I. INTRODUCTION
Carole Sumler wants her Brand X Internet service, but
fears that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
will take it away.1 Sumler is a loyal customer of Brand X
Internet, a small Southern California digital subscriber line
(DSL)2 service provider.' In June of 2005, the United States
Supreme Court rejected Brand X's bid to gain access to cable
networks' broadband lines.4 In NCTA v. Brand X Internet
Services, Brand X unsuccessfully argued that cable
companies, like phone companies, should be required to share
their lines with third-party broadband providers, such as
smaller Internet service provider (ISP) companies like Brand
X.5 The Court, however, sided with the FCC, and upheld the
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 47. J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law. B.A., Business Administration and Political
Science, Trinity University. I would foremost like to thank my family for their
continuing support. I would also like to acknowledge Professor Catherine
Sandoval, my Mass Communications professor, for the class discussions that
aided the ideas in this comment. Special thanks to my Technical. Editor
colleague, my Comments Editor/BME, and Kolache/Mentee.
1. Jeff Bertolucci, Proposed DSL Rules Threaten Small ISPs, PC WORLD,
Sept. 2005, at 22, available at
httpJ/www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid, 121947,00.asp.
2. DSL, or digital subscriber lines, provide access to the Internet through
traditional copper telephone lines. Heather T. Hendrickson, Comment, Cable
Open Access: The FCC Should Establish a National Policy of Staying Out of the
Way of Broadband Competition, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 749, 753 (2000)
(describing DSL services); see also discussion infra Part II.A.3.
3. Bertolucci, supra note 1.
4. See NCTA v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 995-97 (2005).
5. See id.
347
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cable companies' long-standing practice of excluding most
third-party broadband providers from their networks.6
Less than three months after the Brand X Internet
Services decision, the FCC released a Report and Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (DSL Order) that reclassified
wireline broadband, such as DSL, as an information service
provider.7  Prior to the FCC's DSL Order, telephone
companies were required to offer access to DSL lines to other
ISPs at regulated rates.8 By recategorizing DSL as an
information service provider, the FCC effectively relieved the
phone companies who own the DSL lines of their obligation to
lease their lines to smaller private companies. 9 In the wake
of the DSL Order, phone companies were no longer required
to lease their DSL lines to third-party competitors such as
Brand X.' ° This is when Sumler became most concerned-
what would happen to her beloved Brand X if the big phone
companies no longer had an obligation to lease their DSL
lines to the smaller companies?1
One concern that arose during the Brand X litigation and
persists after the FCC's DSL Order is that if small providers
such as Brand X cannot lease broadband lines from cable or
phone companies, the costly task of procuring their own lines
will push them out of business. 2 The FCC's claims that its
order will promote investment in broadband networks 3 will
not convince consumers that life without the small providers
is the better choice. Sumler does not look forward to the
prospect of switching to a larger broadband ISP, which she
believes will not deliver the support and personal attention
6. See id.
7. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, para. 169 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter
DSL Order]; see also discussion infra Part II.C.
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000); see also discussion infra Part II.B.3.
9. DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at para. 169; see discussion infra Part II.C.
10. See Bertolucci, supra note 1. Prior to the DSL Order, telephone
companies were required to lease access to these services to smaller third-party
competitors, pursuant to federal regulations, because they had a monopoly over
the transmission facilities for services such as DSL. See Nirali Patel, Comment,
FCC Broadband Policy: More Power for the Bell Monopolies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV.
393, 406 (2003). These regulated phone companies were known as "common
carriers." See discussion infra Part II.B.
11. See Bertolucci, supra note 1.
12. See discussion infra Part V.A.
13. See DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at para. 1.
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she receives from Brand X, a service provider that has a mere
350 subscribers. 14
This comment will explore the FCC's recent DSL Order
and argue that the DSL Order is inconsistent with the FCC's
own goals and the goals of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (1996 Act). Part II will discuss the background of
broadband Internet access, including the nature of
broadband, 15 the evolution of its regulation through case law
and legislation, 6 and the ultimate reclassification of DSL by
the FCC. 7  Part III will address the problems and
inconsistencies posed by the FCC's DSL Order, 8 while Part
IV will analyze the legitimacy of the DSL Order in light of the
FCC's own goals and the goals of the 1996 Act.' 9 Finally, Part
V proposes instituting forced open access on both cable
modem and wireline broadband in order to promote
competition and to satisfy the goals of the FCC and
Congress.2 °
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Definition of Broadband
1. Broadband as an "Advanced Telecommunication"
"Broadband" has not been defined by either Congress or
the FCC in terms of a specific technology. 21 While consumers
usually equate broadband with the capability of fast access to
information and services over the Internet, such as high-
quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications,22
the FCC refers to broadband service as "advanced
telecommunications. 23
14. See Bertolucci, supra note 1.
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.
17. See discussion infra Part II.C.
18. See discussion infra Part III.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
20. See discussion infra Part V.
21. See Patel, supra note 10, at 399.
22. See Hendrickson, supra note 2, at 752.
23. Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Americans in a
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14
F.C.C.R. 2398, para. 20 (Jan. 28, 1999) [hereinafter 706 Report I].
2007] 349
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In the 1996 Act, the phrase "advanced
telecommunications" is used to describe services and facilities
with an upstream (customer-to-provider) and downstream
(provider-to-customer) transmission speed of more than 200
kilobits per second (kbps).24 The FCC chose this speed as a
benchmark because it is fast enough to provide the most
popular applications, including web-browsing, at the same
speed at which one can flip the pages of a book.25 The 200
kbps refers to the speed, or bandwidth capabilities within
"the last mile," a road analogy the FCC uses to describe the
infrastructure of the network.26
There are two principle means by which a consumer can
receive broadband access: DSL and cable lines.27  DSL
transmits data between the Internet and the end user's
computer via the same copper wires owned by local telephone
companies, while cable modem services use the same coaxial
cable used to transmit television signals owned by cable
28companies.
2. Division of Network Infrastructure
The FCC divides the telecommunications network
infrastructure into four general categories: the backbone, the
middle mile, the last mile, and the last 100 feet.29  The
backbone consists of the long haul communications transport
facilities that provide long-distance, high-capacity, high-speed
transmission paths for transporting massive quantities of
data. ° As the core of the infrastructure, most long haul
transport facilities consist of fiber-optic lines buried under the
ground or under the sea. 1 Providers of the backbone include
long distance companies such as AT&T, Sprint, and Qwest.32
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
28. Id.; see also discussion infra Part II.A.3.
29. Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable And Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 20913, para. 18 (Aug. 3, 2000)
[hereinafter 706 Report II].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See 706 Report 1, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, para. 38 (Jan. 28, 1999).
350 [Vol: 47
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Middle mile facilities, which provide fast, large-capacity
connections between long haul facilities and the last mile, are
usually constructed with fiber-optic lines, although fixed
wireless and satellite links also exist.3 3 Many middle mile
facilities were originally built by telephone and cable
companies for ordinary telecommunications or cable
television services. 4 Middle mile facilities, such as local
telephone companies, often lease capacity on their networks
to non-facilities-based 35 Internet service providers and to
high-speed providers.36 The FCC refers to these local phone
companies as Local Exchange Carriers (LECs)
The last mile is of significant importance because it is
often the missing link in communities that do not have access
to advanced telecommunications capabilities8.3  The last mile
connection to the end user can take the form of cable modem
service, digital subscriber line service, or another LEC-
provided service, terrestrial wireless service, or satellite
service.39
The final segment of the network infrastructure, the last
100 feet, is the most visible to consumers. The last 100 feet
includes the in-house wiring found in a consumer's residence,
the wiring in an apartment or office building, the wiring in a
local area network, or the wireless links in a local wireless
33. 706 Report H, 15 F.C.C.R. at para. 18. The FCC noted in its 706 Report
that AT&T recently upgraded vast amounts of broadband backbone by
extending miles of new fiber-optic cable, and Sprint has implemented fiber-optic
technology that will increase the transport capacity of its existing network. See
706 Report I, 14 F.C.C.R. at para. 38.
34. 706 Report H, 15 F.C.C.R. at para. 24.
35. A facilities-based ISP operates its own facilities for the switching and/or
transmission of telecommunications between exchanges, whereas a non-
facilities-based ISP does not own the transmission facilities used to connect the
end user to the Internet. See NCTA v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
978 (2005).
36. 706 Report H, 15 F.C.C.R. at para. 25.
37. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(26) (2001) ("The term 'local exchange carrier' means
any person that is engaged in the provision of telephone exchange service or
exchange access."). LECs are divided into two categories: "incumbent" (ILECs),
which are usually the original, monopoly LECs, and "competitive" (CLECs),
their newer competitors. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
38. 706 Report H, 15 F.C.C.R. at para. 28.
39. Id. In the FCC's 706 Report, the FCC raised the possibility that the
slow deployment of facilities serving the last mile may be causing the lack of
Internet access to rural communities. See 706 Report I, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, para.
66 (Jan. 28, 1999).
20071 351
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network.4 °
The point of contention lies within the last mile, and
more specifically, the ability of competitive service providers
to use last mile facilities that are capable of supporting
broadband services. Of these competitive services, two major
competitors lead the broadband race: DSL and cable.4'
3. DSL vs. Cable
"Digital subscriber lines" is a generic name for a host of
digital services42 provided over traditional copper telephone
lines.43 DSL has been offered by local telephone carriers since
1996, and as of 2005, represented 37.2% of the residential
broadband market." To supply broadband via DSL, carriers
upgrade the copper wire already in place for telephone
services so that the same wire can support high-speed data
traffic.45
Cable modem service, with a 60.3% market share, is the
current leader of the broadband race. 46  "Cable modem
technologies rely on the basic network structure used to
provide residents with cable television service, but with
upgrades to support broadband services"; the upgrades enable
cable services to have higher data transmission speeds than
DSL services.47
B. History of Regulation
1. Early Categorization of Services
Although both cable modem and DSL provide high-speed
Internet access, historically, they were governed under
40. 706 Report 11, 15 F.C.C.R. at para. 18.
41. Hendrickson, supra note 2, at 753.
42. The digital services provided over traditional copper telephone lines
include Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL), High Bit Rate Digital
Subscriber Line (HDSL), and Single Pair Symmetric Services (SDSL). Id.
Typically, residential customers use ADSL, which allows both traditional voice
and high-speed data to travel over the same line. Patel, supra note 10, at 401.
43. Patel, supra note 10, at 401.
44. DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, at para. 51 (Aug. 5, 2005).
45. Patel, supra note 10, at 401.
46. DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at para. 51.
47. Patel, supra note 10, at 400. To increase bandwidth and improve
reliability, most upgrades use a combination of optical fiber and coaxial cable,
which has a higher data transmission capacity than the standard copper phone
lines used by DSL. See id.
[Vol: 47352
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radically different regulatory schemes. Under the
Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act),' telephone
companies fell under the "common carrier"49 designation and
were regulated under Title II of the Act,5° while cable
operators were regulated separately under Title VI of the
Act.5' Thus, the regulation of broadband depended upon the
categorization of the type of service offered, whether
telephone-based or cable-based. Based on these categories,
services that provided virtually the same functions could be
regulated by different parts of the 1934 Act. This resulted in
great confusion in subsequent attempts to regulate and make
sense of the burgeoning telecommunications industry.
2. The Computer Inquiries
In the 1960s, the merging of the computer and
communications industries integrated data processing and
communications. 2 This created regulatory headaches for the
FCC because of the fundamental differences between the two
industries. 3 Through a series of proceedings called The
Computer Inquiries, the FCC sought to separate the
regulatory approach of each of these industries.
a. Computer I: Data Processing vs. Communication
Services
In Computer I,51 the FCC found that data processing,
such as calculating numbers in a spreadsheet, was recognized
as a highly competitive industry, rendering government
regulation was unnecessary. 55  On the other hand,
48. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 8 Stat. 1064 (1934). The 1934 Act
was amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 216, 607-09 (1996).
49. Patel, supra note 10, at 402 (defining common carriers as carriers
"expected to carry any and all traffic over their networks on a
nondiscriminatory basis at uniform, publicly announced rates" (quoting Adam
D. Thierer, Solving the Broadband Paradox, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. (2002))).
50. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-76 (2000).
51. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-73 (2000).
52. See Patel, supra note 10, at 403.
53. See id.
54. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities (Computer 1), 28 F.C.C.2d
267, para. 11 (Mar. 10, 1971).
55. Id. "Data processing" is the use of the computer for operations which
include storing, retrieving, sorting, merging and calculating data, according to
20071 353
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communications services, including the transmission of
information via e-mail, were viewed as a monopoly requiring
regulation by the government.56 The FCC decided to regulate
communications services as common carrier offerings under
Title II of the Act, but chose to leave data processing services
unregulated.57  Those services combining both
communications and data processing functions, known as
"hybrid" services, would be classified on a case-by-case
basis.58
b. Computer II: Basic Services vs. Enhanced Services
Technological developments made the Computer I
categorizations nearly obsolete as it became more difficult to
distinguish communications from data processing or
computing.59 In response, the FCC created a framework in
Computer II° that defined and distinguished "basic services"
and "enhanced services."61  "These mutually exclusive
categories depended on the function of the process
performed."62 The FCC defined the term "basic service" as
"the common carrier offering of transmission capacity for the
movement of information,"63 with the archetypal example of
basic service being telephone service. 4
The FCC defined "enhanced services" as "services, offered
over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate
communications, which employ computer processing
applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol, or
similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information;
programmed instruction. See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28
F.C.C.2d 291, para. 15 (Apr. 3, 1970) (tentative decision).
56. Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d at para. 23.
57. Id. at para. 11.
58. Id. at para. 27.
59. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations (Computer I1), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, para. 19 (Apr. 7, 1980) (noting how
the phenomenon of distributed processing allowed computers and terminals to
perform both data processing and communications control applications within
the network and at the customer's premises).
60. See id. at para. 5.
61. Patel, supra note 10, at 404.
62. Id. (noting the FCC refrained from regulating hybrid services
predominantly classified as data processing services).
63. Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at para. 93.
64. Patel, supra note 10, at 404.
354 [Vol: 47
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provide the subscriber additional, different or restructured
information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored
information."65  "Thus, enhanced services combined a basic
service, such as telephone service, with an enhancement, such
as computer processing or storage service," resulting in
applications such as Internet access service, voice messaging,
and electronic publishing.66 The significance of the basic-
enhanced services distinction in Computer If was that the
FCC decided to regulate only basic services. The FCC
determined that enhanced services were not within the scope
of its Title II jurisdiction.6 8
Under this regime, incumbent local exchange carriers
(ILECs), such as common carriers, were subject to substantial
federal regulation when providing broadband services.69
ILECs are traditional local telephone companies, which
included the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).70
Since Bell provided what was believed to be the last
remaining naturally monopolistic71  telecommunications
service,72 the FCC was concerned that these carriers with
local telephone distribution networks could use their control
over basic services and engage in anticompetitive behavior,
65. 47 C.F.R § 64.702(a) (2002); see also Computer 11, 77 F.C.C.2d at para.
97.
66. Patel, supra note 10, at 405.
67. See Computer 11, 77 F.C.C.2d at paras. 5-7 (concluding that regulation of
enhanced services is unnecessary because it is not required by statute, is
contrary to public interest, and would not lead to regulatory certainty).
68. See id. at para. 132.
69. See id. (stating that the FCC controls the prices, terms, and conditions
offered by ILECs).
70. See PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 1371
(2d ed. 1999) (defining ILEC as the "[tierm used to refer to the traditional local
telephone companies"). ILECs compete with Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers (CLECs). Id. at 1366.
71. The telephone industry is a classic example of a natural monopoly.
Adam J. Coates, Comment, The First Amendment, the FCC, and Digital
Subscriber Line Service: Will Congress Get it Right This Time?, 5 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 734, 735-36 (2003). A natural monopoly is an industry where the
efficient number of participants is one and there are extremely high entry costs,
making it difficult and expensive for competitors to enter the market. Id. at 736
n.4. The costs of deploying a local telephone network require laying cable to
reach every customer in a community, as well as inventing, building, deploying,
operating, and maintaining the system necessary to switch calls between
customers. Id.
72. Id. at 740. The Bell monopoly began with Alexander Graham Bell's
patents in telephone technology and continued due to Bell's refusal to
interconnect its networks with those of its competitors. See id. at 735.
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disrupting the development of enhanced services markets.73
From the time the 1934 Act was passed, Bell was the sole
proprietor of a vast network of telephone networks virtually
throughout the country; Bell owned, manufactured, or
invented nearly every piece of equipment used to operate and
administer this massive network.74 If an ILEC could deny
competitors access to basic transmission facilities, this would
produce a monopoly by forcing competitive local exchange
carriers (CLECs), the local telephone companies who
competed against the Bell ILECs, 75 to leave the market
because they could not afford to compete. 71
In order to prevent carriers such as ILECs from
leveraging control over basic transmission facilities and
dominating the enhanced services market, the FCC required
facilities-based common carriers to provide the basic
transmission services underlying their enhanced services on a
nondiscriminatory basis to other enhanced service
providers.77  The FCC referred to this obligation as an
"unbundling requirement" on such carriers. 78
Per federal regulations, these carriers had to
"unbundle"79 their basic services from their enhanced
services; the carriers then had to offer their basic service at
the same prices, terms, and conditions, to all enhanced
service providers, including their own enhanced services
operations.8 0 In addition, the FCC imposed a structural
73. See Patel, supra note 10, at 405-06.
74. Coates, supra note 71, at 736.
75. See HUBER, supra note 70, at 1366 (defining a CLEC as a carrier that
provides local-exchange service in competition with an incumbent local-
exchange carrier).
76. Coates, supra note 71, at 736.
77. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations (Computer III), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, para. 4 (May 15, 1986).
78. Id. at para. 6.
79. Under "unbundling," ILECs who owned both basic and enhanced
services are required to separate and establish separate prices for those
components of their transmission services, rather than offering only one
bundled price for the total service. By unbundling, the underlying basic
component can be sold to the competing CLECs. See Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d
384, para. 231 (Apr. 7, 1980); see also DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, para. 24
(Aug. 5, 2005).
80. Id. Computer II states:
Thus those carriers that own common carrier transmission facilities
and provide enhanced services, but are not subject to the separate
subsidiary requirement, must acquire transmission capacity pursuant
356 [Vol: 47
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separation requirement whereby large ILECs were required
to provide their enhanced services through corporate
affiliates, entirely separate from the entity providing basic
services." Accordingly, when an ILEC introduced its own
DSL-based information service, it was required to make
standalone offerings of its underlying DSL transmission
capacity as a common carrier service. 2 CLECs competing
with the ILEC were then able to purchase DSL transmission
service from the ILEC, and combine it with their own
Internet applications and service in order to offer their own
Internet access product to end users.8 3
c. Computer III: Continuing Open Access
Computer lIY4  replaced Computer Irs structural
separation requirement with a set of nonstructural
safeguards designed to give all enhanced service providers
nondiscriminatory access to network facilities.8 5  These
obligations, similar to those already required under Computer
II, required an RBOC's enhanced services operations to set
terms to the basic services it used in offering enhanced
services, with these basic services being made available to
other enhanced service providers and users under the same
terms on an unbundled and functionally equal basis. 6
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996
The 1996 Act was passed in part to address the changing
landscape of communications created by the emergence of
new technology such as the Internet, and the deployment of
such technology to the public.8 The FCC maintained the
to the same prices, terms, and conditions reflected in their tariffs when
their own facilities are utilized. Other offerors of enhanced services
would likewise be able to use such a carrier's facilities under the same
terms and conditions.
Id.
81. See Computer H, 77 F.C.C.2d at para. 208.
82. John T. Nakahata, Broadband Regulation at the Demise of the 1934 Act:
The Challenge of Muddling Through, 12 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 169, 172
(2004).
83. Id.
84. See Computer III, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, para. 3 (May 15, 1986)
85. See id. at paras. 3-4.
86. Id. at para. 4.
87. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 216,
607-09 (1996).
2007]
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distinction between regulated basic services and unregulated
enhanced services in the 1996 Act.88  While the 1996 Act
preserves the regulatory scheme created under Computer II,
those services previously characterized as basic services and
enhanced services were renamed "telecommunications
services" and "information services" respectively. 89
Like basic services, telecommunications services are
defined as the provision of pure transmission capability.90 On
the other hand, information services involve the provision of
enhanced functionality, such as the manipulation or storage
of information.9  Like enhanced services, information
services are almost completely free of common carrier
regulation; in contrast, telecommunications services are
bound by the common carrier regulations which regulate
basic services.92
The FCC has consistently characterized the DSL
provided by an ILEC or CLEC to an ISP as a
telecommunications service.93 Hence, in regulating DSL as a
telecommunications service, the 1996 Act affirmatively
required the Bell companies to unbundle the components of
their DSL service and lease them to their competitors at
government regulated, cost-based rates.94 In contrast, cable
modem Internet access services are characterized as an
information service.95 Thus, while DSL has been largely
88. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(20), (46) (2000) (defining the terms "information
service" and "telecommunications service").
89. Id.
90. See Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over
Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 708 (2001).
91. See id. (noting any deviation from pure transmission transforms the
service into an information service).
92. See HUBER, supra note 70, at 983-84 (noting that data services over
cable are similarly exempt from common carrier regulation under Title II of the
1934 Act).
93. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, para. 25 (Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter
Wireline Order] (stating that the FCC's "prior conclusion" that DSL
transmission constitutes a telecommunications service).
94. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000) (defining the high-frequency portion of local
loops, over which DSL service is provided, as an unbundled network element
that must be provided to requesting carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis).
95. See Wireline Order, 17 F.C.C.R. at para. 19 (stating that providers of
wireline broadband Internet access furnish users with the ability to run a
variety of applications consistent with the 1996 Act's definition of information
service, the offering of a "capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing or making available information
358 [Vol: 47
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regulated by the government, cable modem services remain
free from such regulation.
Congress, 06 the FCC,97 and the White House 9 have all
expressed the need to keep the government's hands off the
Internet and allow markets to determine what shape the
Internet will take in the future.9" The 1996 Act states that its
policy is "to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and other
interactive media [and] to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation." 00 In an effort to keep the
Internet "unfettered," cable companies were not subjected to
any congressional requirement of open access to competitors
or FCC oversight, despite the fact that cable service is similar
to the Bell companies' DSL service.'
In part, the 1996 Act was enacted to require the Bell
companies to allow competitors to access their monopolistic
local markets.0 2 This "open access" requirement, which
required providers to carry the information of competitors,
would create competition in the consumer market, thereby
offsetting the natural monopoly inherent in the last mile
connection. 10 3  By giving companies the rights to purchase
via telecommunications" (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000) (original emphasis
removed))).
96. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (stating that "it is the policy of the United
States . . .to promote the continued development of the Internet . . . [and] to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market ... unfettered by Federal or
State regulation").
97. See, e.g., DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, para. 3 (Aug. 5, 2005) ("[Tlhe
appropriate framework for wireline broadband Internet access service,
including its transmission component, is one that is eligible for a lighter
regulatory touch.").
98. See, e.g., Nancy Victory, Assistant Sec'y of Commerce, Nat'l Telecomm.
& Info. Admin., Keynote Address at the Alliance for Public Technology
Broadband Symposium: Creation of a Broadband Universe: A "Big Bang
Theory," (Feb. 8, 2002) (transcript available at
http'//www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/speeches/2002/apt,_020802.htm) (stating that
"the market, not government, should drive broadband's roll-out").
99. Coates, supra note 71, at 744.
100. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
101. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) ("[A] person engaged in ... broadcasting [such
as a cable company] shall not... be deemed a common carrier.").
102. Coates, supra note 71, at 741.
103. Steven Aronowitz, Brand X Internet Services v. FCC: The Case of the
Missing Policy Argument, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 887, 891 (2005).
2007] 359
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services from a telecommunications provider at wholesale
rates and to resell those services to consumers in competition
with the original provider, 10 4 the 1996 Act sought to control
monopoly power with market power by imposing open access
requirements on DSL. Cable, on the other hand, remained
unregulated.
4. Case History
Despite a congressional mandate to deploy advanced
communications on a timely basis under the 1996 Act, the
FCC did not immediately determine the classification for
cable modem service. As a result, several federal courts took
the opportunity to regulate national communications policy.
a. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland
The dispute in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland'° arose
from the merger of AT&T with Telecommunications, Inc.
(TCI).0 6 TCI was a cable provider that operated in Portland,
Oregon under the city's local franchising authority. 10 7 Under
the 1996 Act, local governments could regulate cable services
for the specific purpose of preserving competition. 0 The
extent of this authority was contingent upon whether the
service in question could be defined as cable; the 1996 Act, in
contrast, explicitly prohibits franchising authorities from
regulating telecommunications services. 10 9
104. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)(1), (c)(4).
105. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
106. Id. at 873. "On June 24, 1998, AT&T announced its intent to merge
with TCI, under which AT&T would become the parent company of TCI and
integrate its telecommunications business with TCI's cable network, thereby
building a facilities-based local residential telecommunications network
(including the last mile)." Hendrickson, supra note 2, at 756.
107. See AT&T, 216 F.3d at 875.
108. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(d)(2). The statute states:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State or
franchising authority from prohibiting the ownership or control of a
cable system in a jurisdiction by any person . . . in circumstances in
which the State or franchising authority determines that the
acquisition of such a cable system may eliminate or reduce competition
in the delivery of cable service in such jurisdiction.
Id.
109. See 47 U.S.C. 541(b)(3)(B) ("A franchising authority may not impose any
requirement under this title that has the purpose or effect of prohibiting,
limiting, restricting, or conditioning the provision of a telecommunications
service by a cable operator or an affiliate thereof.").
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Under the assumption that TCI's cable modem service
fell under the category of "cable services," the city of Portland
attempted to condition the merger of AT&T with TCI on the
provision that AT&T provide open access to other competing
ISPs over the broadband cables in Portland.1 ° In response,
AT&T brought an action seeking a declaration that the
condition violated the 1996 Act."1  AT&T ultimately
prevailed, and the franchise agreement transfer condition
was nullified, because the Ninth Circuit held that cable
modem service was not a "cable service" as defined by
statute.112 Instead, the court held that cable modem service
was a hybrid formulation-partly an information service and
partly a telecommunications service." 3  Since the 1996 Act
prohibited local governments from regulating
telecommunications services, Portland's condition on the
merger proved to be incompatible." 4 Therefore, AT&T was
able to move forward and ignore the city's condition on the
merger.115
In 2002, however, the FCC sought to correct the Ninth
Circuit's categorization of cable modem service, noting that in
AT&T Corp., the court made its decision "based on a record
that was less than comprehensive." 6  In a Declaratory
Ruling, the FCC officially concluded that "cable modem
service, as it is currently offered, is properly classified as an
interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that
there is no separate offering of telecommunications
service.""' In effect, the regulation of cable modem Internet
service would fall squarely within the FCC's jurisdiction as
an information service, a category which had never been
110. AT&T, 216 F.3d at 875. The franchise agreement between Portland and
TCI included language allowing the city to "condition any Transfer upon such
conditions, related to the technical, legal and financial qualifications of the
prospective party to perform according to the terms of the franchise, as it deems
appropriate." Id.
111. Id. at 875-76.
112. See id. at 876-77.
113. See id. at 878.
114. See id. at 879-80.
115. See id.
116. High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798, paras. 56-57 (Mar. 14, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of
proposed rulemaking).
117. Id. at para. 7.
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subject to regulation.118
b. Brand X Internet Services v. FCC
Seeking a review of the FCC's Declaratory Ruling, the
Ninth Circuit, in Brand X Internet Services v. FCC"9 revisited
its previous decision in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland. 120 In
Brand X, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]e must decide
whether our prior interpretation of the Telecommunications
Act controls review of the [FCC's] decision to classify Internet
service provided by cable companies exclusively as an
interstate 'information service. '"121
The appellate court vacated the FCC's finding that cable
modem service constituted an information service, citing
stare decisis as the basis for its opinion. 22 By contradicting
the FCC and restating that cable modem broadband services
were neither exclusively an "information service" nor a
"telecommunications service," but rather, a combination of
the two, the Ninth Circuit subjected cable companies to open-
access rules that governed the telephone industry. 123
The FCC and the United States Solicitor General
challenged the Ninth Circuit's decision as a usurpation of
national communications policy, arguing that the court
limited the growth of cable broadband services by imposing
burdensome regulations. 24 Along with the government, the
National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA),
joined by Charter Communications, Cox Communications,
and Time Warner Cable Inc., asked the Supreme Court to
review the Ninth Circuit's decision to vacate the FCC's
conclusion that broadband over cable was an information
service. 125  Agreeing with the FCC's conclusion that
118. See id. at para. 59.
119. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
120. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
121. Brand XInternet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1123.
122. Id. at 1131-32.
123. Id. at 1126 n.11. The practical result was that cable broadband
providers would continue to be required to open their lines to competing ISPs.
124. J. Israel Balderas, Speaking with One Broadband Voice: The Case for a
Unified Circuit Appeals Process After Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 13
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 377, 424 (2005).
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18-19, NCTA v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 543 U.S.
1018 (2004) (No. 04-277), 2004 WL 1944011; see also Brand X Internet Servs.,
345 F.3d 1120, cert. granted sub nom. NCTA, 543 U.S. 1018 (No. 04-277).
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broadband services should be minimally regulated, the NCTA
contended that if cable modem service, and by extension
every other broadband service, was subject to common carrier
regulation, this would stifle the much needed investment,
innovation, and broadband deployment sought by the U.S.
economy.
126
c. NCTA v. Brand X Internet Services
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
NCTA v. Brand X Internet Services, 27 and ultimately
overturned the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
Communications Act. 28  The Court held that the Ninth
Circuit should have used the framework adopted in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,129
whereby any ambiguities in a statute may be interpreted and
resolved by an agency if that statute is within an agency's
jurisdiction and the agency's interpretation is reasonable. 130
Further, Chevron required federal courts to accept the
agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's
reading differed from a particular court's preferred statutory
interpretation. 131
To that end, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's
categorization of cable broadband services as an information
service, noting that just because a cable company offers
consumers "an information service in the form of Internet
access ... via telecommunications . . . it does not inexorably
follow as a matter of ordinary language that they also offer
consumers the high-speed data transmission
(telecommunications) that is an input used to provide this
service. 1132 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the FCC's
construction was a reasonable policy choice. 33
126. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 125, at 19.
127. NCTA v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
128. See id. at 980.
129. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron's interpretation of the term "stationary source," as it
was used in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, was rejected and Chevron's
definition had to defer to the Environmental Protection Agency's construction of
the term because that agency's interpretation was deemed reasonable. Id.
130. NCTA, 545 U.S. at 981-82.
131. Id. at 980.
132. Id. at 989.
133. Id. at 1000. The Court found that the FCC's interpretation was
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Although the Court recognized that the FCC's treatment
of cable modem service was inconsistent with its treatment of
DSL service, the Court declined to express any view upon this
discrepancy. 34  The Court noted that "the Commission's
decision appears to be a first step in an effort to reshape the
way the Commission regulates information-service
providers." 35
C. DSL Order: In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband
Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities
The Brand X Court's foreshadowing of the FCC's
regulation of DSL and information service providers proved to
be true. On September 23, 2005, the FCC released a Report
and Order and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (DSL Order)
which established a new regulatory framework for broadband
Internet access services offered by wireline facilities-based
providers. 136 Basing its decision on NCTA v. Brand X and the
goals set forth in the Wireline Order proceeding, 137 the
framework of the order seeks to establish a minimal
regulatory environment for wireline broadband Internet
access services. 38  In effect, the FCC would no longer
categorize wireline broadband, such as DSL, as a regulated
telecommunications service. Instead, wireline broadband
reasonable because the FCC's interpretation of the 1996 Act would not allow
communications providers to evade common carrier regulation simply by
bundling a telecommunications service with an information service, despite the
respondents' arguments to the contrary. Id. at 996-97. Further, the Court
found that the FCC's description of cable modem service as something more
than a transparent transmission path from an end user perspective to be
reasonable. See id. at 999.
134. See id. at 999-1000.
135. Id. at 1002.
136. See DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (Aug. 5, 2005).
137. See Wireline Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, paras. 3-6 (Feb. 14, 2002). The
goals include: (1) to encourage the ubiquitous availability of broadband to all
Americans; (2) to include in the Commission's regulatory framework any and all
platforms capable of fusing communications power, computing power, high-
bandwidth intensive content, and access to the Internet; (3) that broadband
services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes
investment and innovation in a competitive market; and (4) to strive to develop
an analytical framework that is consistent, to the extent possible, across
multiple platforms. Id.
138. See DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at paras. 3-6 (deciding that the appropriate
framework for wireline broadband Internet access service is one with "a lighter
regulatory touch").
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would be categorized as an information service, effectively
putting DSL in the same unregulated class as cable modem
Internet service. 139
Characterizing wireline broadband as an information
service effectively left DSL outside of Title II common carrier
regulations. 4 ° The practical effect is that wireline carriers
would no longer be required to unbundle the underlying basic
transmission from wireline Internet access service and offer it
on a common carrier basis.' In other words, wireline
carriers would be able to choose when and how to offer
broadband transmission capacity.
The FCC states that its primary purposes in establishing
this new framework are: (1) to encourage the ubiquitous
availability of broadband to all Americans; (2) to develop a
consistent regulatory framework across platforms by
regulating like services in a similar functional manner; and
(3) to allow facilities-based wireline broadband Internet
access service providers to respond to changing marketplace
demands effectively and efficiently.4 2
In its accompanying policy statement,' the FCC adopts
several principals "to ensure that broadband networks are
widely deployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all
consumers."' 44 These principles state that consumers are
entitled to: (1) access the lawful Internet content of their
choice; (2) run applications and use services of their choice;
(3) connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the
network; and (4) competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers. 4 5
III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Although it seems that imposing fewer regulations on
139. See id. at para. 12. The FCC explains that wireline broadband Internet
access service is not a telecommunications service because Internet access
services "inextricably intertwine transmission with information-processing
capabilities." See id. at para. 9.
140. See id. at para. 86.
141. See id.
142. See id. at para. 1.
143. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (Aug. 5, 2005) (policy statement)
[hereinafter Policy Statement].
144. Id. at para. 4.
145. Id.
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wireline broadband access providers is a laudable decision by
the FCC, it is not without negative consequences. The FCC's
DSL Order is inconsistent with the goals stated in the DSL
Order, the goals of its Policy Statement, and the goals of the
Telecommunications Act. In particular, two issues are
compromised: competition and network neutrality.
146
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Missing Competition
The fundamental goal of the 1996 Act is to promote
competition in local telecommunications markets. 147  The
1996 Act mandates the FCC to encourage development of
advanced telecommunications capability, or broadband: "The
Commission . . . shall encourage the deployment on a
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications
capability to all Americans ... by utilizing ... measures that
promote competition in the local telecommunications
market."4 s
Nevertheless, the effects of the FCC's recent order which
classifies wireline broadband Internet access as an
information service, and the conclusion that Computer II
unbundling obligations no longer apply to ILECs in their
provision of broadband services, is inconsistent with the 1996
Act.149  In fact, rather than promoting competition, the
proposed rule will have the opposite effect of reducing
competition in the wireline broadband market, resulting in a
cable-ILEC duopoly in the overall broadband market. 5 '
The DSL Order will reduce competition within the DSL
146. Network neutrality is the idea that the Internet should not favor one
application over another. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband
Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145 (2003); infra Part
IV.B.
147. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000) (stating that the United States' policy
seeks to "preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services"); see also Wireline
Order, 17 F.C.C.R. at para. 5 (stating the FCC "will strive, as directed by
Congress" to promote the competitive environment currently existing for the
Internet).
148. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat.
153 (1996) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000)).
149. Patel, supra note 10, at 422.
150. See id. at 421.
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market. If CLECs no longer have access to cost-based rates
to the local networks necessary to provide broadband, ILECs
will be left as the only providers of DSL service. 5' Although
the FCC states that facilities-based wireline carriers are
given the choice to offer broadband Internet access services
on either a common carrier or a non-common carrier basis,152
thus giving DSL providers the option of offering access to
their lines, it is more likely that incumbents will deny access
to nonaffiliated ISPs in order to protect and increase their
own revenue streams.5 3 ILECs are not likely to voluntarily
open their networks when they are no longer required to by
law.15 4  As a result, ILECs will favor their own ISPs and
smaller ISPs will be pushed out of the market.
In addition, the DSL Order will reduce consumer choice
among ISPs because the DSL order will not only reduce
competition in the DSL market, but it will also reduce
competition among all ISPs. 15 5 Although DSL providers
would face broadband competition from cable providers, in
some areas, logistics dictate that cable modem service is the
only choice.5 In many instances, DSL will not be an
alternative because it cannot reach the subscriber's location
or because DSL cannot offer the bandwidth necessary for a
particular application. 157 Furthermore, cable modem service
may not even be an alternative because it is not deployed
everywhere. 5 8  Therefore, while a fully competitive DSL
market will impose some market constraints on cable modem
service providers, the level of competition will nevertheless be
minimal, and in some situations, nonexistent.' 59
The FCC contends that lack of competition is not
problematic because "many consumers have a competitive
choice for broadband Internet access services today."160 The
FCC further asserts that although not all American
151. Id.
152. See DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, paras. 9-10 (Aug. 5, 2005).
153. Patel, supra note 10, at 423.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 422.
156. See Aronowitz, supra note 103, at 903.
157. Steven A. Augustino, The Cable Open Access Debate: The Case for a
Wholesale Market. 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 653, 668 (2000).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, para. 47 (Aug. 5, 2005).
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households have a choice between cable modem and DSL-
based Internet access service today, "a wide variety of
competitive and potentially competitive providers and
offerings are emerging in the marketplace."1 61 The FCC cites
satellite, wireless, and broadband over power lines as
emerging forces that are able to compete with DSL and
cable. 162  However, as of December 2004, among those
consumers who subscribe to broadband or narrowband
Internet access service, 60.3% receive cable modem service
and 37.2% receive DSL service. 6 3 This means that nearly
98% of Internet users subscribe to either cable modem or
DSL. As a result, the time it will take for any of these
"competitors" to become viable challengers to cable or DSL is
significant. Although potential substitute technologies exist,
the question of whether they will be practicable enough in the
marketplace to provide a disruptive force against the cable-
DSL duopoly remains open.'6
Both the 1996 Act 165 and the FCC's own DSL Order and
accompanying policy statement 66 direct the FCC to preserve
the competitive market in which the Internet exists.
Nevertheless, the effects of the FCC's ruling that classifies
wireline broadband internet access as an information service,
and the implication that Computer II unbundling obligations
will not apply to ILECs in their provision of broadband
services, is inconsistent with these goals because competition
among wireline providers, as well as competition between
ISPs, will be compromised.
B. The Lack of Network Neutrality
As the number of ISPs in the broadband Internet access
service market decreases, the risk that ILECs will engage in
discrimination against Internet content increases. 67 The
161. Id. at para. 50.
162. See id.
163. Id. at para. 51.
164. Nakahata, supra note 82, at 178.
165. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000) (stating that the United States' policy
seeks to "preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services").
166. See Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, para. 4 (Aug. 5, 2005) (stating
that "consumers are entitled to competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers.").
167. Patel, supra note 10, at 423.
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concept that the Internet should not favor one application is
known as network neutrality.16' Those who support network
neutrality argue that a communications network, such as the
Internet, is a platform for competition among application
developers. 169  For example, since e-mail, the Web and
streaming applications are battling for the attention and
interest of end users, it is important that the platform be
neutral to ensure the competition remains merit-based. 70
Nevertheless, evidence of discrimination has been cited
from several sources, including consumer complaints about
cable operators who ban classes of applications or equipment
like servers, virtual private networks, or wi-fi devices.' 7 '
Although the broadband operators cited legitimate goals,
such as price discrimination and bandwidth management, 72
the Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators 173 has
determined that broadband access providers have the ability
to discriminate and that it is technically feasible for cable
operators to deny access to unaffiliated content. 74
The consequences of banned content or applications,
however, are mitigated when a consumer has several Internet
access providers from which to choose. For example, cable
operator AT&T Broadband defined home networking 75 as
"theft of services," and threatened subscribers who
participated in home networking with civil and criminal
168. Wu, supra note 146, at 145.
169. Id. at 145-46.
170. Id. at 146.
171. Id. at 143. Servers are computers that store files at the edge of the
network and fulfill requests for those files from other users. Christopher S. Yoo,
Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1861
(2006). A virtual private network (VPN) provides a private encrypted
connection over a public network such as the Internet. See Andrew Beckerman-
Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 1, 28 (2004). Wi-fi devices may be used in a wireless local area
network. See Wi-Fi Alliance, Knowledge Center, Glossary, http://www.wi-
fi.org/glossary.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
172. See Wu, supra note 146, at 143.
173. The Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators (CBUI) is an ad hoc
group, which includes Microsoft, Yahoo, and the Media Access Product. Riley K.
Temple & Mary Greczyn, Recent Developments in Broadband Regulation, in 813
22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION
175, 203 (2004).
174. Id.
175. Home networking occurs when a user connects multiple computers or
devices within a home or office location with a single DSL account and single IP
address. See Wu, supra note 146, at 157 n.45.
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penalties.176 In contrast, DSL provider Verizon clearly stated
in its service contract that home networking is permissible.
177
DSL provider Sprint went as far as to say that subscribers
"may run home networks, web servers, and ... 'will have
complete unrestricted access to all content available on the
Internet. ' 1 78  Therefore, a consumer who wishes to connect
several of his or her home computers together on a network
could choose Sprint as their Internet access provider, as
opposed to a different provider who expressly prohibits home
networking. Competition between broadband providers
serves as an incentive to control content or application
discrimination, less a provider lose customers because of their
overly stringent service contracts.
Nevertheless, in the absence of rigorous market
competition to bar broadband providers from blocking
applications or refusing to carry certain kinds of content,
regulatory intervention may be necessary. 179  If wireline
broadband providers no longer have to lease their lines to
private companies, and the only viable choice for consumers is
the duopoly of cable or DSL, broadband providers will lack an
incentive not to bar applications or content. No longer
threatened with loss of customers to a competitor with more
lenient subscriber agreements, ILECs may ban whatever they
please without fear.
Furthermore, if networks are not neutral to applications
and content, this will hinder investment incentives for
broadband application development. 180 Network neutrality is
an evolutionary process by which developers of new
technologies compete in a survival-of-the-fittest process.1
8 1
Those applications that gain the most interest and afford the
most utility to end users will come out on top.
8 2
Nevertheless, a lack of competition that leads to the
regulation of applications will hinder such development and
investment.
Although the FCC seems to place a premium on the
176. Id. at 157.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 157-58.
179. Temple & Greczyn, supra note 173, at 200-01.
180. Id. at 204.
181. Wu, supra note 146, at 145.
182. See id. at 145-46.
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importance of network neutrality for end users, by
deregulating wireline broadband, the FCC diverges from its
own goals. In the FCC's accompanying policy statement for
its recent DSL Order, it maintains that in order "to encourage
broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open
and interconnected nature of the public Internet," consumers
should be entitled to "access the lawful Internet content of
their choice . . . run applications and use services of their
choice, . .. [and] connect their choice of legal devices that do
not harm the network."" 3 In accordance with these goals, the
DSL Order refers to its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
imposing requirements necessary "to create a broadband
regulatory regime that is technology and competitively
neutral. "is4
However, there is no mention in the DSL Order's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, of any steps toward consumer
protection in the realm of content or application regulation. 185
Although issues of slamming,8 6  truth-in-billing l s7  and
network outage reporting 88  are mentioned among the
proposed rulemaking, there is nothing related to creating any
"technology and competitively neutral" broadband regime.8 9
The FCC does briefly comment on content-related
requirements in a subsection of the DSL Order entitled
"Other Proposed Alternative Regulations for Wireline
Broadband Internet Access Services."'9 ° While the FCC notes
that it recognizes that "actively interfering with consumer
access to any lawful Internet information, products, or
services would be inconsistent with the statutory goals of
encouraging broadband deployment . . . [the FCC does] not
find sufficient evidence in the record . . . that such
183. Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, para. 4 (Aug. 5, 2005).
184. See DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, para. 4 (Aug. 5, 2005).
185. See id. at paras. 146-59.
186. Slamming is "submitting or executing an unauthorized change in a
subscriber's selection of a provider of telephone exchange service or telephone
toll service." Id. at para. 150.
187. Truth-in-billing rules "ensure that consumers receive accurate,
meaningful information on their telecommunications bills." Id. at para. 152.
188. Network outage reporting requires providers "to notify the Commission
of outages thirty or more minutes that affect a substantial number of customers
or involve major airports, major military installations, key government
facilities, nuclear power plants, or 911 facilities." Id. at para. 154.
189. See id. at para. 4.
190. See DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at paras. 96-97.
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interference . . . is currently occurring."19' The FCC
maintains that "should [it] see evidence" of such a violation,
"[it] will not hesitate to take action to address that
conduct." 92
Since the FCC does not view content and application
neutrality as a current threat, it has not taken steps toward
regulating network neutrality. Instead, it has adopted a
"wait-and-see" approach, whereby it will deal with any
violations once they become a "current threat."193
Nevertheless, this strategy deviates from the FCC's own
policy statement in which three out of its four policy goals
relate to content or application neutrality for consumers.19 4
In addition, with the absence of competition, wireline
broadband providers will no longer have an incentive to keep
their networks neutral in order to entice customers, further
compromising the FCC's own policy goals.
V. PROPOSAL
The central goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is
to promote competition in all telecommunications markets by
expanding opportunities for new entrants to provide services
to their customers. 95 In order to achieve this objective, the
FCC must "pave the way" to ensure that all providers have
access to alternative wholesale last mile facilities. 196 To this
end, a reversal in the FCC's policy is necessary.
A. A Reversal to Ensure Competition
The FCC should alter its interpretation of cable and DSL
broadband as information services by defining all broadband
transmissions as "telecommunications services," and not
merely "telecommunications," so that the Computer II
unbundling obligations will apply. Although unbundling
191. Id. at para. 96.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, para. 4 (Aug. 5, 2005).
195. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(l)-(2) (2000).
196. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, para. 4 (Aug. 1 1996) (first
report and order) (stating that local competition "is intended to pave the way for
enhanced competition in all telecommunications markets, by allowing all
providers to enter all markets").
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obligations do not cover information services, the FCC should
make an exception in cases where the ISP is the ILEC itself
because as long as ILECs possess control over basic
transmission facilities, they have the potential to dominate
the wireline broadband market and hinder competition. 19 7
The NCTA Court originally upheld the FCC's
categorization of cable broadband service as an information
service based on Chevron, the case that held that any
ambiguities in a statute may be interpreted and resolved by
an agency if the agency's interpretation is reasonable. 19
However, no ambiguity exists because the 1996 Act and The
Computer Inquiries are clear on their face. Both plainly state
that DSL provided by an ILEC or CLEC is a
telecommunications service. 199 Further, even if the 1996 Act
and The Computer Inquiries are found to be ambiguous, the
FCC has nevertheless acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. Any agency which interprets acts of Congress in a
manner which hinders competition and contrary to that
agency's own policy goals has failed to engage in reasoned
decision making.
The key to attaining each of the FCC's goals lies in
maximizing consumer choice and competition, both of which
may be achieved by allowing new market entrants to
compete. Defining broadband as a telecommunications
service would have this practical effect; through the
imposition of forced open access requirements on both
wireline broadband lines and cable broadband lines, both
providers would have to unbundle and share their
infrastructure with competitors. Providing requesting
carriers with access to last mile facilities on a wholesale basis
is the most effective way to foster competition, create
incentives for compliance with the market-opening provisions
in the 1996 Act,2 0 and meet the goals set forth in the FCC's
197. Patel, supra note 10, at 423.
198. See NCTA v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); see also
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
199. See Wireline Order, supra note 93, at paras. 25-26 (presenting the FCC's
"prior conclusion" that DSL transmission constitutes a telecommunications
service).
200. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000) (stating that the United States' policy
seeks to "preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services").
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DSL Order201 and its accompanying policy statement.2 2
First, increasing competition by allowing more entrants
into the last mile would allow more Americans to access
broadband. Since 1996, Congress has made it a top priority
for the FCC to "encourage the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability
to all Americans ... by utilizing ... measures that promote
competition in the local telecommunications market."20 3
Without choices beyond the impending cable-DSL duopoly,
consumers will be forced to pay non-competitive rates for
their broadband access.0 4 Subscribers who cannot pay the
cable systems' or ILECs' inflated rates will continue to be
excluded from advanced services. 205 However, by requiring
minimum open access requirements for both wireline and
cable systems, consumers will have more choices with more
competitive rates.2°6
Second, a "consistent regulatory framework across
platforms,"20 in concert with a primary goal208 of the DSL
Order, can be achieved if both cable and ILECs are subject to
forced open access requirements. Although the FCC
maintains that consistency is realized because neither cable
nor DSL is required to provide open access, the FCC's
interpretation of wireline service as an information service
merits no deference because the FCC's line of reasoning is
arbitrary and capricious. In application, regulatory parity is
not truly attained. Under the DSL Order, broadband
201. See DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, para. 1 (Aug. 5, 2005) (stating that
the FCC's primary purposes in establishing the DSL Order are: (1) to encourage
the ubiquitous availability of broadband to all Americans; (2) to develop a
consistent regulatory framework across platforms by regulating like services in
a similar functional manner; and (3) to allow facilities-based wireline broadband
Internet access service providers to respond to changing marketplace demands
effectively and efficiently).
202. See Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, para. 4 (Aug. 5, 2005) (stating
that consumers are entitled to: (1) access the lawful Internet content of their
choice; (2) run applications and use services of their choice; (3) connect their
choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; and (4) competition among
network providers, application and service providers, and content providers).
203. Advanced Telecommunications Incentives, Pub. L. 104-104, § 706, 110
Stat. 153 (1996) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000)).
204. See Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. at para. 4.
205. See id.
206. See Augustino, supra note 157, at 666.
207. DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, para. 1 (Aug. 5, 2005).
208. See supra text accompanying note 203.
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providers may nevertheless choose to offer the transmission
component of broadband Internet access service as a common
carrier service if they so choose. 20 9 Therefore, no consistent
regulatory framework across all platforms is achieved at all if
providers are given this choice. Under the current regime,
the systems are free to act as duopolists, maximizing their
revenues at the expense of consumers. 210  "By contrast, a
system that subjects both wires to open access requirements
would ensure that both ILECs and incumbent cable systems
are driven primarily by market pressures."211
Further, increasing competition through forced open
access would spur investment in broadband capabilities,
consistent with the third goal of the FCC's DSL Order.21 2 If
both wireline and cable systems are forced to open their lines
to smaller ISPs, there will be more choices available for
consumers. Threatened with losing traffic to other broadband
networks, each competing broadband service provider will
face market pressures to develop new and innovative
services.21 3 "In addition, the increased competition along the
last mile will most likely lead to greater innovation due to a
need to offer better technologies to increase customer
satisfaction."2 4
In contrast, left under the current regime, duopoly
competition would not be sufficient to spur investment. In a
market dominated by a duopoly, entry by competing service
providers will be more difficult and the development of
technologies and service offerings will be impeded.215 In the
absence of competition from multiple competitors, cable and
DSL will have no incentive to make new and better systems
since there would no longer be a threat of being ousted by an
innovative competitor. Instead, operators will become
complacent and deviate from innovative decisions.216
The FCC's current wait-and-see attitude will cause
irreparable harm because the lack of open access will
209. See DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at para. 89.
210. See id.
211. Augustino, supra note 157, at 665.
212. See DSL Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at para. 1.
213. See Aronowitz, supra note 103, at 905.
214. Myles Roberts, Note, Opening the Last Mile to Competition, 4 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 309, 339-40 (2005).
215. Augustino, supra note 157, at 670.
216. Hendrickson, supra note 2, at 774.
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eradicate the smaller competitive ISPs. Any later efforts
toward re-regulation will fail to create any viable competition
because of the enormous advantage cable and DSL will build
by that time through their duopoly. Therefore, the FCC
should adopt minimum open access requirements
immediately. Consumers want their broadband services now,
and if they have no choice among providers, many will pay
the inflated rates demanded by the cable-DSL duopoly.
17
The longer the FCC waits, the more money providers will be
able to extract from consumers through non-competitive
rates.218
B. A Reversal to Achieve Network Neutrality
Forced open access will also serve as a means of
achieving network neutrality, which would accomplish the
FCC's policy goal of ensuring consumers the right to run the
applications and services of their choice.219 Open access
would prevent broadband operators from bundling various
broadband services together, such as Internet service with
cable service.220 If broadband providers are required to
unbundle their services, customers who have a pre-existing
cable provider for their television will not be required to use
that same provider for Internet access, giving the customer
more choices for their services.
By requiring broadband operators to lease their lines to
smaller ISPs, consumers will have more options available for
ISP choices. When consumers have more choices, broadband
providers will face market pressure to keep their networks
neutral in order to appeal to current and prospective
customers. In the absence of such competition, ISPs will have
no incentive to refrain from banning content or applications,
which would directly conflict with the FCC's policy objectives
of allowing consumers to access the content and run the
217. See Augustino, supra note 157, at 666.
218. See id.
219. See Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, para. 4 (Aug. 5, 2005) (stating
that consumers are entitled to: (1) access the lawful Internet content of their
choice; (2) run applications and use services of their choice; (3) connect their
choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; and (4) competition among
network providers, application and service providers, and content providers).
220. See Wu, supra note 146, at 147.
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applications of their choice.22'
VI. CONCLUSION
The FCC's classification of wireline broadband does not
merit deference because it was determined in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. The DSL Order's attempt to
accelerate broadband deployment by providing ILECs with
regulatory parity will instead reduce competition in both the
DSL market and the broadband ISP market, as well as
hinder network neutrality. "Competition cannot thrive along
the last mile until competitive service providers have equal
access to last mile facilities. ,,222 The only way to offer such
access on a non-discriminatory basis to all service providers is
for the government to immediately impose a forced open
access scheme.223 In doing so, broadband can be made
available on a wholesale basis, thereby satisfying the FCC's
objectives through maximization of competition, consumer
choice, and neutral access.
221. Id.
222. Roberts, supra note 214, at 340.
223. Id.
20071 377

